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| 1 | UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY JAMES J. WALDROW |
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| 3 | IN THE MATTER OF: |
| 4 | : CASE NO.: 04-4667(RTL) MONTGOMERY WARD, LLC, et al.,: Trenton, New Jersey : July 20, 2006 |
| 5 | Debtor : |
| 6 | MONTGOMERY WARD, LLC, et al.,: |
| 7 | PLAINTIFFS : |
| 8 | : ADVERSARY PROCEEDING -vs- : NO.: 02-9282 |
| 9 | OTC INTERNATIONAL, LTD., : |
| 10 | DEFENDANTS : |
| 11 | X |
| 12 | TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING RE: TRIAL TO RECOVER PREFERENTIAL TRANSFERS |
| 13 | BEFORE THE HONORABLE RAYMOND T. LYONS UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE |
| 14 | APPEARANCES: |
| 15 | For the Debtor: ASK FINANCIAL, LLP |
| 16 | BY: JOSEPH L. STEINFELD, JR., ESQ. KAREN M. SCHEIBE, ESQ. |
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| 1 | [| | | INDE | X | | |
|----|--------|-------------|-----------|-----------|--------------|---------|-------|
| 2 | WITNES | S | DIRECT | CROSS | REDIRECT | RECROSS | COURT |
| 3 | JACK W | ILLIAMS | 3 | 42 | 128 | | 129 |
| 4 | WILLIA | M SHAFTON | 137 | 159 | 172 | 173 | 174 |
| 5 | HOLLY | ETLIN | 177/192 | 192 | 203 | | 190 |
| 6 | RANDY | BROWN | 207 | 248 | 271/280 | 275 | 275 |
| 7 | | | | EXHIBI | TS | | |
| 8 | NO. | DESCRIPTION | ON | | | IDENT. | |
| 9 | D-13 | Expert re | port by W | illiams | | 12 | |
| 10 | D-14 | Revision | to D-15 | | | 13 | |
| 11 | P-23 | 12/14/99 | vendor le | etter | | 212 | |
| 12 | P-24 | 1999 audi | ted finar | ncial sta | tement | 215 | |
| 13 | P-25 | 1/00 thro | ugh 2/00 | financia | al statement | 223 | |
| 14 | P-27 | 4/30/00 f | inancial | statemer | nt | 232 | |
| 15 | P-29 | 7/13/00 \ | endor le | tter | | 261 | |
| 16 | P-36 | Summary o | of financ | ial state | ements | 232 | |
| 17 | 1 | 8/24/00 H | | | | 273 | |
| 18 | P-44 | | | | impact rep | | |
| 19 | P-53 | to P-55 | Graphs of | payment | patterns | | |
| 20 | P-56 | to P-59 | McCreedy | accounti | ng data | 139 | |
| 21 | P-60 | _ | eport by | | | 187 | |
| 22 | P-76 | Graph sh | owing eff | ect of t | erms change | 156 | |
| 23 | | | | | | | |
| 24 | | | | | | | |

| 1 | THE CLERK: All rise. The United States |
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| 2 | Bankruptcy Court District of Delaware, the Honorable Raymond |
| 3 | T. Lyons presiding. |
| 4 | THE COURT: Good morning. Thank you. |
| 5 | MR. STEINFELD: Good morning, Your Honor. |
| 6 | MR. SCHACHTER: Good morning, Your Honor. |
| 7 | THE COURT: Please be seated. Thanks. Mr. |
| 8 | Schachter. |
| 9 | MR. SCHACHTER: Yes, Your Honor. The defense |
| 10 | calls Jack Williams. And Your Honor, if you could affirm |
| 11 | rather the swear the witness? |
| 12 | THE COURT: Yes, certainly. |
| 13 | WITNESS, JACK WILLIAMS, AFFIRMED |
| 14 | THE COURT: All right. Please have a seat. |
| 15 | THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honor. |
| 16 | THE COURT: All right, Mr. Schachter. |
| 17 | DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. SCHACHTER: |
| 18 | Q Mr. Williams, for whom are you currently employed? |
| 19 | A At this time I'm currently employed by Georgia State |
| 20 | University College of Law in Atlanta, Georgia, where I'm a |
| 21 | professor of law there and also B.D.O. Seidman, an |
| 22 | accounting and financial advisor and consulting firm in |
| 23 | Atlantic and New York, as well as a consultant with the |
| 24 | Department of Homeland Security and on occasions, the |
| 25 | Department of Defense. |

- Q Okay. And has your employment changed since you testified at the consolidated trial of this action?
- 3 A No, it has not.
- Q Could you tell us your professional and educational background and experience in the field of statistics and
- 6 statistical analysis?
- A Yes, I can. As I mentioned, I'm a professor at Georgia

 State University. In the law school I teach bankruptcy
- business reorganization, mergers and acquisitions,
- bankruptcy accounting, law and statistics, law and finance,
- 11 and tax cases.

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I'm also a director at B.D.O. Seidman, as I mentioned, an accounting and consulting firm, where I work in the business reorganization or restructuring group. As a director there I work on numerous engagements in the area of bankruptcy accounting, financial advisory work, tax and statistical consulting in areas of financial fraud, invoice fraud, assurance sampling, valuations, damage modeling and detection of money laundering.

We are retained at B.D.O. by debtors in possession, by creditor's committees, by trustees and various vendors in some instances, examiners on bankruptcy work across the board. We do a large amount of preference work on both sides of the docket, preparing preference detail, including the aging of invoices through the payment details,

| 1 | collecting and/or requesting items such as checks, receipts |
|----|--|
| 2 | and clear dates and the like. We do descriptions of that |
| 3 | detail and analysis, statistical analysis of that detail and |
| 4 | that's one of my primary areas of responsibility. |
| 5 | And before going to work with B.D.O. in 1999, I was the |
| 6 | co-developer of a web based platform that offered a |
| 7 | preference detail and statistical analysis, a package known |
| 8 | a Preference Hawk. That's a product of Credit Hawk. The |
| 9 | application has been used by trustees and vendors and it |
| 10 | continues to be used by trustees and vendors. |
| 11 | I'm also a CIRA, the C.I.R.A., a certified in solvency |
| 12 | and restructuring advisor. The CIRA is obtained through a |
| 13 | three week program and a battery of three examinations. |
| 14 | Among the body of knowledge that's attested in the |
| 15 | certification process is the preparation of preference |
| 16 | detail and preference analysis. |
| 17 | MR. STEINFELD: Excuse me, Your Honor. It seems |
| 18 | the witness is reading something. I'm just wondering if |
| 19 | he's just reading his testimony or is he testifying. |
| 20 | THE WITNESS: Oh, I'm testifying. I just have my |
| 21 | notes. |
| 22 | MR. STEINFELD: Oh. Is that okay, Your Honor? |
| 23 | THE COURT: I'll ask the question. What are you |
| 24 | referring to Professor Williams? |
| 25 | THE WITNESS: I'm just referring to my notes, just |

| 1 | to move it along. |
|----|--|
| 2 | THE COURT: Any objection? |
| 3 | MR. STEINFELD: Well, not at this stage, but I |
| 4 | think later on, unless there is I'd like to see the notes |
| 5 | then. It would seem to me that if he's going to be offering |
| 6 | testimony from written notes, I think I'd have a right to |
| 7 | see them. |
| 8 | THE COURT: Well, I don't think so. |
| 9 | MR. STEINFELD: Okay. |
| 10 | THE COURT: I'm going to overrule the objection. |
| 11 | BY MR. SCHACHTER: |
| 12 | A Okay. Part of the certification process is the |
| 13 | examination on the preparation of preference detail, |
| 14 | description and analysis of preference detail. And I |
| 15 | received the and this is a nationwide examination and I |
| 16 | received the gold medal in the CIRA certification |
| 17 | examination, which is an award that's given to the person in |
| 18 | a particular year that receives the highest mark. |
| 19 | I also lecture in the area of preference analysis |
| 20 | description and preference detail and have done so with the |
| 21 | American Bankruptcy Institute, the American Bar Association, |
| 22 | the New York Credit Institute, National Association of |
| 23 | Credit Managers and the Commercial Law League of America. |
| 24 | I was the inaugural Robert M. Zinman Scholar In |

Residence of the American Bankruptcy Institute and one of

25

the projects I worked on was statistical analysis and development of statistical models in describing and analyzing preference detail.

I'm also the present inaugural scholar in residence for the Association of Insolvency and Restructuring Advisors.

And there I do much the same thing, including the development of statistical modeling so that we can detect invoice fraud, other types of financial fraud, money laundering and the like.

In 1998 and 1999 I was engaged by the Fulton County
Georgia Grand Jury Commission as a statistical consultant
and testifying expert in developing statistical models to
determine whether there was any racial discrimination in the
formation of grand juries in Fulton County. I was also
retained by the City of Atlanta to develop statistical
analysis of quality of life crimes and the like.

I've testified as an expert in a couple of cases involving statistical analysis, including the <u>Flooring</u>

<u>America</u> case before Judge Bihary in Atlanta, where I did an analysis of the preference detail, the statistical analysis and the like. And I also testified before Judge Bernstein in the Eastern District of New York in regard to valuations and that statistical modeling of solvency analysis.

I've also worked as a testifying expert but did not go to trial in cases involving check kiting and financial

irregularities where I've developed statistical models to detect unusual financial behavior or abnormal financial behavior.

I also have been retained or was retained by the subcommittee of bondholders in the Owens-Corning bankruptcy case where I did an analysis of future claims held by the asbestos claimants. And that analysis included the statistical modeling and claims estimation.

I've written several Bar Review articles and a book on related topics to what I'm going to discuss today, particularly statistical analysis and the general legal area.

Since 2004 I've been a special advisor in intelligence analysis and terrorism studies to, as I mentioned, the Department of Homeland Security and in some occasions to the Department of Defense. In that capacity I developed statistical modeling for purposes of threat assessment, statistical modeling for purposes of minimizing improvised explosive devices or IED contact with U.S. soldiers in Iraq. I also developed threat assessments of various cities for purposes of the allocation of Department of Homeland Security money to the various state and local agencies and statistical analysis and profiling of suspicious activity around, in particular, chemical plants and petroleum plants.

THE COURT: All right. Anything else regarding

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1
      Professor Williams qualifications?
 2
                 MR. SCHACHTER: No, I think we have to move this
      along, Your Honor.
 3
 4
                 THE COURT: All right. Now do you want me to
 5
      recognize Professor Williams as an expert?
 6
                 MR. SCHACHTER: Yes, I do, Your Honor.
 7
                THE COURT:
                             In what area?
 8
                MR. SCHACHTER:
                                 Statistics and statistical
 9
      analysis.
10
                THE COURT: Any objection?
11
                MR. STEINFELD: No, Your Honor.
12
                THE COURT: All right. I would be glad to do
13
      that.
14
      BY MR. SCHACHTER:
           Professor Williams, was B.D.O. Seidman retained by OTC
15
16
      in this prong of the trial?
17
      Α
           Yes, it was.
18
           And what was its retention?
      0
19
           B.D.O. Seidman in this prong of the trial was retained
      to do essentially a preference detail and analysis of
20
      various financial information that was provided by us to OTC
21
      as well as A.S.K./Montgomery Wards. The idea was to, within
22
23
      the scope of retention was to prepare a preference detail,
     to describe it, to analyze it in a way to understand it.
24
25
      Q
           And were you the individual at B.D.O. Seidman who
```

- 1 particularly worked on this retention?
- 2 A Yes, I was. I was not the only one. Mr. Diamato, may
- 3 he rest in peace, and I actually were retained as the
- 4 potential and then the experts in the case. But there were
- 5 several people who worked under us, as well, at B.D.O.
- 6 Seidman.
- 7 Q And you mentioned that OTC supplied you with certain
- 8 information. What type of information did OTC supply you
- 9 with?
- 10 A OTC supplied us with the typical array of information
- 11 that would be necessary to prepare a preference detail. It
- 12 provided information involving invoices, invoice terms, pay
- dates, check amounts, the aging of receivables. It provided
- us other financial information in both what we would call a
- historical or testing period and the preference period.
- 16 Q And if I could turn your attention and ask you to open
- defendant's exhibit D-15, which is the bound book in front
- 18 of you?
- 19 A Yes, I have it.
- Q Okay. Do you recognize defendant's D-15?
- 21 A Yes, I do.
- 22 Q And was that some of the information that was provided
- 23 by OTC that you relied on?
- 24 A Yes, it is.
- Q And I'd like you to flip to the next exhibit, which is

- 1 D-16. Do you recognize that?
- 2 A May I have just a minute please? Yes, I do.
- 3 | Q And was that also financial information supplied by OTC
- 4 | that you relied on?
- 5 A Yes, it is.
- 6 | Q And did you -- I believe you also said that you
- 7 reviewed some information that had been prepared by the
- 8 plaintiff.
- 9 A Yes, we did.
- 10 | Q And what do you recall reviewing?
- 11 A I recall reviewing a spreadsheet, aging receivables
- from the invoice date that identified certain summary or
- certain payments within certain columns including a
- 14 historical period and a preference period, breaking them
- down by percentages, I believe, of payment amount and
- percentages, I believe, of invoice number.
- 17 | Q And I'd now like to direct your attention to
- 18 | defendant's 12A. If you'd look at that.
- 19 A Yes.
- 20 Q And then go to 12C and finally to 12E.
- 21 A Yes.
- 22 O And are those three exhibits information that you also
- relied on or reviewed?
- 24 A Yes, it is.
- 25 Q And after reviewing and gathering this information did

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1
     you prepare any report?
 2
           Yes, we did.
 3
           And I'd now like to ask you to look at exhibit 13,
      defendant's exhibit 13. Do you recognize defendant's
 4
 5
      exhibit 13?
 6
           Yes, I do. It is the report that Mr. Diamato and I
 7
      prepared.
 8
           And I'd like to now --
 9
                MR. STEINFELD: Your Honor, can I just --
10
                THE COURT:
                            Yes.
11
                MR. STEINFELD: Thank you. This report was in
      part subject to the motion in limine, the discussions of
12
13
      order of the Court. And I'd rather not -- I sort of want to
14
      discuss it now so I can get a general sense from the Court
15
      as to how far we can go into this report. There are certain
16
      segments of the report where this witness gives his opinion
17
      concerning the ultimate issue as to what is preferential.
18
                I believe the Court has ruled as to those
19
     particular portions of the report they're not going to be
20
      coming into evidence because of our motion in limine.
21
      don't want to jump up and down and object if there's
22
      something on a page. I'm going to assume the discussions
23
     will be subject to the Court's ruling on the motion in
24
      limine, if that's fair.
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THE COURT: Mr. Schachter.

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1
                MR. SCHACHTER: I certainly intend to follow Your
 2
      Honor's ruling.
 3
                THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
 4
                MR. STEINFELD:
                                Thank you.
 5
      BY MR. SCHACHTER:
 6
           Professor Williams, if you would now turn to exhibit
 7
      D-14?
 8
      Α
           Yes.
 9
           Do you recognize exhibit D-14?
10
      Α
           Yes.
11
           And what is that, sir?
12
           That's a revision to -- essentially a revision to
      exhibit 15.
13
14
                MR. STEINFELD: Your Honor.
15
                THE COURT:
                            Yes.
16
                                We object to D-14 and it was
                MR. STEINFELD:
17
      specifically raised in the motion in limine and ruled upon
18
      by the Court, because D-14 is basically this witness's
19
      opinion as to what he believes is ordinary and not ordinary
20
      in this case. And if you look through it, and I think the
21
      Court maybe has already done that, it's replete with that.
22
      So I don't see how we can have testimony concerning this
23
     particular exhibit today. And especially just the cover
      sheet alone talks about in and out and totals and that's
24
25
      this witness's conclusion as to what he feels if he were the
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| 1 | trier of fact. |
|----|--|
| 2 | MR. SCHACHTER: What exhibit are you looking at? |
| 3 | MR. STEINFELD: Are you looking at D-14? |
| 4 | MR. SCHACHTER: Yes. |
| 5 | MR. STEINFELD: Well, the first page of D-14 says |
| 6 | stratified ordinary course analysis. It says totals in, |
| 7 | out, both in, out. |
| 8 | MR. SCHACHTER: It's statistics. I mean if you |
| 9 | want to voir dire on it, it's statistics. |
| 10 | THE COURT: No, we're not going to have voir dire. |
| 11 | This is I haven't reviewed this document, but it appears |
| 12 | to me to be primarily taking the base data and applying some |
| 13 | analysis to that and coming to a conclusion as to what's |
| 14 | ordinary and not ordinary. That conclusion is something |
| 15 | that I'll make, but the underlying data the witness can |
| 16 | certainly testify as to underlying data. |
| 17 | MR. STEINFELD: I definitely agree with that. I'm |
| 18 | just pointing out that and I guess I'll just have to go |
| 19 | as I listen to the questions. |
| 20 | THE COURT: All right. And I'm sure that your |
| 21 | expert report treats data similarly, I would imagine. I |
| 22 | haven't looked at it. |
| 23 | MR. STEINFELD: Well, you'll get the I don't |
| 24 | think so, but that's subject to when the time comes. |
| 25 | THE COURT: Okay. |

1 BY MR. SCHACHTER: I'd now like to direct you back to exhibit D-13 and 2 3 within that, your exhibit 5. MR. SCHACHTER: Again I'm sorry, Your Honor. We 4 5 didn't bate stamp the pages. THE COURT: Yes, but I was informed previously 6 that there's a footer. 7 MR. SCHACHTER: Yes, and there's also along the 8 right-hand column it will say it, but there's also a footer 9 on the lower left of all the pages, which say which exhibit 10 11 it is. THE COURT: Yes. Let's see. All right. I have 12 13 exhibit 5, I think. Okay. MR. SCHACHTER: Are you ready, Joe? 14 MR. STEINFELD: Your Honor, I don't have any 15 problem with page 1 on exhibit 5 as far as it appears to be 16 statistical analysis. If you're going to refer to page 2 of 17 exhibit 5, to the extent that there is, you know, 18 conclusions, especially if you look at the upper boxes, he 19 reaches his conclusions as to what he thinks the exposure 20 should be. And that, of course, I would think would be the 21 subject of the granting of the motion in limine. 22 The stuff below, when it talks about -- it looks 23 like it would be more statistics, I don't have a problem 24 with that. So basically it's just the top three boxes and I

25

guess there's a middle box. 1 2 THE COURT: All right. 3 MR. STEINFELD: Okay? 4 THE COURT: I think I'll be able to sift through 5 it. MR. STEINFELD: I think you will, too, Your Honor. 6 7 BY MR. SCHACHTER: Professor Williams, can you explain to us what exhibit 8 9 5 represents? Exhibit 5 is an exhibit that simply lists the summary 10 statistics regarding both the payment activity in the 11 testing or historical period and the payment activity in the 12 preference period. 13 And could you go through that with us? 14 Yes. First, we start again, as I mentioned, through 15 the OTC's input and A.S.K.'s input through the data, we 16 create a historical period and we create a preference period 17 of detail. And so exhibit 5 ties into exhibits 8 and 10 for 18 purposes of the matter today. 19 When you say exhibits 8 and 10, you mean exhibits 8 and 20 10 to you report? 21 That's correct. I'm sorry. Exhibits 8 and 10 to the 22 Α report. When we were developing the databases, which are 23 the historical period and the preference period, we tally 24 25 the invoices, we age the invoices and we identify the

payments associated with those particular invoices. Then we also notice that there were vendor charge backs and discounts as well that would have to be applied to the preference amount to get the net preference amount.

When we were analyzing the data we were looking at a little over 900 invoices in the preference period -- excuse me, in the testing period and approximately 604 invoices in the preference period.

Then we looked at how charge backs were handled in preparing the preference detail by OTC. OTC had during the preference period, I think something around 26,000 or maybe a little more, I can check -- let me check real quick -- about \$75,000 in charge backs on about \$2.8 million in the large preference amount before you net out the discounts of \$360,000 and the charge backs of \$75,000.

In the preference period you had \$75,000 worth of charge backs. Most of these charge backs in our discussions with OTC, came from the return of goods by Wards. And OTC's internal records would not assign that particular charge back to a particular invoice. So they used basically the first in, first applied rule where they would take a charge back and apply it to the first invoice that was listed on a check remittance, for example. And that's the approach that we take at BDO when we can't tie a particular charge back directly to an invoice.

Q So that's an acceptable and ordinary way of applying those types of charge backs?

A That is correct, particularly in the return of goods situations where oftentimes you can't tie a charge back to an invoice. OTC's information and approach was that way and that's the approach that we commonly do. That would leave a large number of invoices, however, that are zeroed out, because during the preference period of the 604 invoices well over 300 are very small amounts. So they get zeroed out.

And so one of the questions is when you do preference analysis, particularly in the preference period, because this is not an issue in the historical period, it's so small there. But in the preference period when you do a preference analysis and you have charge backs like this that zero out a lot of invoices, but we're looking at a very, very small amount of dollars, do you do an analysis of the entire 604 invoices or do you do an analysis of the ones that are actually paid by check. We did both.

Now what we found is the difference between the two was immaterial. There was about a \$30,000 difference in amount and as I'll show in just a minute, under both analyses the summary statistics hold very strongly across the board. There was essentially no change in payment amount by percentage and a very small change or a change, but an

- insignificant change in the spread of the data. Again,
- 2 because you had over 300 invoices that were paid, there were
- 3 | 60 day term invoices that were paid in the preference period
- 4 that were very, very small. And I can show you that and
- 5 that presented an issue for analysis in just developing the
- 6 data set.
- 7 Q Now you said you could show us that. Where would that
- 8 be in your report?
- 9 A Okay. If you begin first with exhibit 15 of the
- report, and this is the actual exhibit 15, not the cover
- 11 material to exhibit 15, and you look at page 9 of exhibit 15
- of the report, that's page 9 of 14, if you look at the total
- of the charge back amounts, you'll see \$26,360.19.
- 14 Q That's the VCB amount?
- 15 A That's correct. Vendor charge backs. And those were
- 16 from return of goods. If you now go back to page 1 of 14,
- 17 you'll see check number 5377243 at the bottom. The check
- cleared the date of October 11th, 2000.
- 19 Q Yes.
- 20 A Okay. When you apply the charge backs, the vendor
- 21 charge backs consistent with OTC's records and the process
- 22 that we do when we can't tie it directly to an invoice,
- you'll see that all of the amounts are very small. A large
- 24 number of invoices will be zeroed out by the vendor charge
- 25 backs. In fact, the zeroing out goes from 1 of 14 all the

way to page 8 or 14 and you can see that by the paid amount column. It's zero as long as the credits and discounts are exceeding the invoice date. And ultimately 322 and a half of thereabouts, about 323 invoices would be zeroed out with only \$26,000 in credit. And we're talking about a vastly large amount of alleged preference here.

THE COURT: Give me that number again. 323 invoices zeroed out.

THE WITNESS: 323 invoices, 322 and a part of the 323rd invoice zeroes out.

BY MR. SCHACHTER:

A So again the question is if you're actually analyzing payments through the transfers that are being scrutinized, what would you do with these invoices that are zeroed out not by a check necessarily, but zeroed by a credit. Well, we looked at it both ways and we found that the differences in the summary statistics are not statistically significant. And I'll show you those differences in just a minute.

In fact, in two columns, well, in all three columns the weighted mean does not change because on exhibit 3, the three columns for the three different samples, the weighted mean does not change because again, although a number of very small invoices are being zeroed out. And so whether you consider 266 invoices, the ones that survived the credit or the charge backs, or all 604, it doesn't change the

weighted mean. It only changes the standard deviation in the historical period slightly.

So this is an anomaly in the information, the financial information, which is not unusual and something we are accustomed to. And these invoices, very small amounts, tied up -- remember they're 60 day invoices that were paid in the preference period tied up to the description of the invoices that Rothline testified to yesterday as to those invoices, a large number of small invoices that Ward did not receive according to Mr. Rothline.

- Q Why don't we go back now to exhibit 5 of your report.
- 12 A Yes.

Q And could you explain if we go down to the area that says statistical summary days past due analysis, that portion of your report. Could you explain that?

A I certainly will. We originally aged the invoices from invoice date to check clear date and when doing that we saw a bi-modal distribution, two humps. And we also were aware that there was a change of terms approximately a little over a month before the preference period. And the change in terms when we aged from invoice date to pay date, the change in the invoice terms, the stated terms, accounted for virtually all of the variability between the two payment cycles, if you will.

In other words, the change in terms from 60 days to 30

days, which was a 30 day change in terms, had actually reduced the payment cycle from invoice date to pay date 30 days or about 30 days, which would suggest that the terms change had significance between the parties and and that the payments from the due date seemed to be rather stable.

So what we then did was after noting that there was a reduction of approximately 30 days in Ward's payment cycle as well as OTC's cash conversion cycle, that's the corresponding relationship with the 30 day reduction in terms, we then aged the invoices from a days past due analysis.

When you age the invoices from a days past due analysis you get a distribution and the distribution is slightly positively skewed in that the mean or in that the mode is less than the median and the median is less than the means. So you've got a longer right tail, if you will, in days past due and you can see that graphically in exhibit 4 to my report, in particular exhibit 4, page 1 and page 2, where you see the tail to the right of the average is a longer than the tail to the left. But the skew is a mild skew so based on my experience we could still go forward with the basic analysis that we would traditionally do in a preference detail.

Q Now you've used terms of mode and weighted mean and mean and could you define those for us?

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A Certainly. The mean is the arithmetic average or arithmetic mean. That's just a summation of all of the days past due dates divided by the total population. The mean is a measure of central tendency. It's benefit is that it can be manipulated mathematically to develop among other things, a confidence interval based on standard deviation. The mean is also something we're really comfortable with and it's a common descriptive metric. Batting averages in baseball, for example, are the arithmetic mean.

The downside to any mean though is because the mean represents every data point in the data set, every transfer, it's influenced by among other things, out-lyers, things that are clearly from a practical perspective so broad that we would all agree that there was a anomaly. So an invoice that's paid 500 days past due will have an effect on the mean and will shift that mean towards the right a greater mean. So that's the downside of the mean.

Q Okay. And in statistics how do you address that, those out-lyers?

A Well, we can address those out-lyers in one of two ways. If we're most interested in payment amounts, then the weighted mean is an appropriate way in which to describe the measure of central tendency. But it's only one statistic. Another way in which to handle the out-lyers is that in the statistical literature and in my experience, out-lyers are

generally defined as a value or a data point in a set of data that's greater than four standard deviations from the mean.

And one of the ways in which to handle out-lyers is to simply what's known as trim the mean. That is, to remove the out-lyers but to note that the out-lyers have been removed and then take a look at whether the out-lyers had an effect on the mean itself.

We did both here. We calculated the weighted means. And the weighted mean is simply a measure that recognizes or an assumption really, as assumption to a measure that recognizes that not all transfers should be equally treated. Let's say a payment on a dollar invoices may be very different, should be treated very different than a payment on a \$50,000 invoice. So we calculated that weighted mean based on the dollar amounts actually paid by a particular check associated with a particular invoice.

Q Let me ask you a question at this point because you said that the dollar might affect if it was a smaller amount or a larger amount, and that's why you look at weighted average. Assuming that we have a computer payment system where invoices are posted, due dates are noted, and then when the due date passes by a computer system the payments are issued. Would weighted mean have as much of a statistical meaning in that type of system?

A Well, in that type of system, it would still be important but not necessarily as powerful. And the reason, as an estimator, the reason that may be the case is that the wonderful benefit of an automated check processing system is that once the due date is triggered, the automated system takes over and so we can oftentimes simply look at the distribution of checks and payments and see evidence that would suggest that the payment process was automated with very little human input because oftentimes the bands, the intervals are much tighter, tighter than a human being would do because they take vacations and they are sick sometimes.

But all of these estimates that we're talking about right now, which are the central tendency estimates are point estimates. They're giving you a specific days past due in our example. They can be used to create an interval. And for a number of reasons in statistical literature and my experience, an interval analysis is a much better approach than picking a specific date. That is, a point estimate is just one point. An interval estimate will be a range.

Other than -- if I could go then, besides the weighted average we have the median. And the median is just simply line up all of the days past due from the smallest to the largest and that particular point, like the seesaw, that balances the data set is the median. The mode is a days past due date that occurred more often than any other days

past due date. All of those, the mean, the weighted mean, the median and the mode are measures of the central tendency or what would a typical days past due number be if we were looking at a point estimate.

So if we look at the testing period, the mean is 24 days past due, the weighted mean is 29 days past due.

THE COURT: Where are you looking at?

A I'm sorry. Exhibit 5, the first column, testing period. It starts with 905 invoices.

THE COURT: All right.

A Okay. The mean is 24 days past due. The weighted mean is 29 days past due. The median is 17 days past due. And the mode is 14 days past due that occurs about 115 times. Now remember I talked about the zeroing out of invoices because of vendor charge backs. We analyzed here 905 invoices. The actual number of invoices that we analyzed in the detail that is behind this is 973 invoices. Now if you calculate the weighted mean based on the 973 invoices you get 29, so no difference in weighted mean. And if you calculate the median, you get 17 as well.

So we see here no difference. So the question of how we handle the vendor charge backs for purposes of describing the data and for purposes of creating a statistical interval, which is not the same thing as the factual determination or the legal interval, I'm talking just the

statistical interval today, is not going to be influenced by in the historical period on that vendor charge back issue that I described, and again, largely because it's very small amounts in relation.

If we look at the testing period excluding out-lyers, which is the second column, the mean is -- now we've excluded out-lyers, the mean is 22 days past due, the weighted mean is 28 days past due and the median is 17 and the mode remains as 14, which occurred 115 times.

What we did then from a statistical perspective is to develop an interval estimate. That is, we have a measure of central tendency. The next step -- you know that is what's the typical days past due date look like. But the next step was to create now this interval estimate and we do this by using standard deviations, but there are many ways. One could be the standard deviation. Another could be quartile approach, bucket it up in quarters. Another can be a decile approach, bucket it up in tens or even a percentile approach, you know, bucket it up in ones. What we did here is we show you all of those particular characteristics.

- Q What does standard deviation mean?
- A The standard deviation is a measure of variability. It is a measure of the distribution of all of the items in the data set about the mean. It measures each value, each days past due date against the average and compares those

- differences and creates a number, a positive number and then
- 2 | measures the distribution. And smaller standard
- distributions -- excuse me. Smaller standard deviations
- 4 suggest a tighter band relatively speaking and larger
- 5 distributions or larger standard deviations suggest a larger
- 6 band.
- 7 Q And why is that something that you look at as a
- 8 statistician?
- 9 A As a statistician you're looking at a sample of data
- and you're trying to describe that sample. That's what
- 11 statistics does. It's simply tries to describe a
- 12 distribution of numbers. And you can describe that
- distribution of numbers by looking at the central tendency,
- 14 | which we talked about, that would be the mean, the weighted
- 15 | mean, the median and the mode.
- But you can also describe it and should describe it by
- 17 | its distribution because you could have a situation where a
- distribution of data, two of them that you're comparing have
- 19 the same mean, but one could have a real tight foot, a big
- 20 | hump for example, and the other could be, if you graph it,
- 21 | could have a very, very long, relatively speaking foot to
- 22 | the data. So you want to look at from a statistical
- perspective you want to look at the data in a way that will
- 24 help you understand not only its central tendency, but its
- 25 | shape, if you will, if you were to graph it.

- 1 |Q Under the train or back of the train.
- 2 A That's correct. And standard deviation is a common
- 3 tool because it's a function of the mean, it's commonly
- 4 | accepted within the statistical literature and within the
- 5 statistical profession as a statistical measure of
- 6 dispersion. Then we calculated --
- 7 O Now are you --
- 8 A I'm sorry.
- 9 Q Go ahead.
- 10 Q We calculated the standard deviation for the testing
- period and that calculation was 31 days. Now if you added
- 12 back the charge backs, the invoices that were zeroed out by
- the charge backs, instead of 31 days you get 34 days,
- because now you have a little variation because the charge
- backs do have a slight effect. But again this is not
- 16 significant from my perspective. A standard deviation of 31
- days for the testing period excluding the out-lyers, you
- should see a shorter or tighter band, and we do, 22 days.
- And of course if we bring back in the vendor charge backs,
- 20 that would go from 22 days to 24 days, again not
- 21 statistically significant.
- So at this particular point in time, the common
- 23 statistical methodology would be to construct a confidence
- 24 | interval. And within the social sciences, which would
- include legal scholarship, again I'm speaking specifically

on the statistical side, not necessarily legal significance, statistical significance, the confidence interval that's most commonly accepted at a minimum would be two standard deviations from the mean.

Two standard deviations from the mean should capture about 95 percent of the data points within the data set.

And two standard deviations from the mean will then allow us to conclude with a 95 confidence interval or a P value it's called a .05, that if we find a days past due number that's outside of two standard deviations from the mean, that days past due number cannot be attributed to chance alone. There has to be something afoot, something significant. And we would call that statistical significance.

So when you construct two standard deviations on the testing period, the general, the full testing period, you get a two standard deviation of 30 days before the due date to 86 days after the due date. Anything outside of that interval would be statistically significant. Now I want to reiterate that doesn't mean it's factually significant, yes or no, or legally significant, yes or no. This is purely statistical significance.

If you look at the testing period excluding the out-lyers we would expect again that band to be decreased and it does. For statistical significance at the .05 level or 95 percent confidence interval, any payment that's

outside of 22 days before the due date or outside of 66 days past the due date would be statistically significant. That is the difference between it and our measure of what the typical average days past due should be that can't be attributed to chance. Just the general things that we deal with in life, that there has to be something that is at least significant from a statistical perspective. So that the range then from a statistical perspective is 22 days before the due date to 66 days past the due date.

What we then did after building those descriptive statistics, is look at the preference period and ultimately we'll take the statistical descriptive and apply them to the preference period as kind of a template to see whether we've got any statistically significant differences in the results.

In the preference period we have an average of 40 days past due, we have a weighted mean of 22 days past due. And I just want to mention here, if we put back the invoices that were zeroed out from charge backs, the weighted mean is also 22 days past due. Because again, it's a small number in dollar amount, about \$30,000 or so. The median is 19 days, so we see a 2 day difference. The mode is 18 days, which occurs 26 times.

Now when we construct the standard deviation here, we see the standard deviation is 56 days, which is much broader

from the standard deviations in both the testing period and testing period excluding out-lyers, which would suggest that on an invoice by invoice basis, as opposed to a dollar basis, what you would have here is a broader distribution of days past due for example -- the broader distribution of invoices as opposed to the actual amounts that are being paid.

What we then did at this time though, is take the standard deviate, the confidence interval that we created, which was two standard deviations of 22 days before the due date to 66 days after the due date, which is statistical significance and an acceptable level, and apply them to the preference period. And we saw what invoices from a days past due perspective would fall within the confidence interval.

And that's what, on the next page of exhibit 5, that's what that first box is all about. If you simply use --

MR. STEINFELD: I'm going to have to again reiterate my objection now because he's now taking statistics and applying them and making an opinion as to what he believes it to be within the range of ordinary.

THE COURT: All right. What we're going to do is we're going to take the word ordinary course that Professor Williams used in his report and substitute confidence interval. All right?

| 1 | MR. STEINFELD: I'm okay with that. |
|----|--|
| 2 | THE COURT: Is that fair? |
| 3 | THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honor, that's perfectly |
| 4 | fair. |
| 5 | BY MR. SCHACHTER: |
| 6 | A So that we can create a confidence interval at 95 |
| 7 | percent of minus 22 days to 66 days past due. When you do |
| 8 | that, in the preference period about 96 percent in amount of |
| 9 | the payments fall within that confidence interval. If I can |
| 10 | direct your attention back to exhibit 5, the first page, I |
| 11 | just wanted to point out we also did a decile approach, |
| 12 | again just as a distribution. |
| 13 | THE COURT: Before you move to that, I just want |
| 14 | to look at make sure I'm looking at the right things. |
| 15 | This 96 percent is shown where? |
| 16 | THE WITNESS: The 96 percent would be on page 2 of |
| 17 | exhibit 5. It would be the approximately 2.2 million |
| 18 | divided by the 2.3 million basically under the column there. |
| 19 | THE COURT: The first box on the upper left-hand |
| 20 | side? |
| 21 | THE WITNESS: That's correct. And if we change |
| 22 | all that to confidence interval then what would fall in the |
| 23 | confidence interval would be \$2,297,751.41 or a total |
| 24 | alleged preference of \$2,395,936.62. |
| 25 | BY MR. SCHACHTER: |

- Q And then you were going to refer back to exhibit 5.
 You were talking about the lower right-hand?
- A Yes, we also have distributions there and if you go
 from the 1st to the 9th decile, you get during the testing
 period excluding out-lyers, 11 days to 46 days. Now you
 don't have the same confidence interval. It's less than 95
 percent. But it's another way of looking at the
 distribution of the data.

What we then did was to bucket the data, another way in which to assess the actual distribution. And at the bottom of exhibit 5, page 2, we bucket the data from minus 22 to 0 days. I mean we have total amounts. Then less than or equal to 23 days before the due date and minus 22 to 0 days and 1 to 25 days, then 26 to 45 days, 46 to 66 days, and greater than 66 days. Now the minus 22 to 0 days counting from that column, one, two, three, four, four columns, is your confidence interval of .95 or 95 percent. That's minus 22 days to 66 days.

We also then took a look at a tighter range, 1 to 45 days. And when we look at 1 to 45 days, during the testing period, and that's the two buckets there, during the testing period in 1 to 45 days you see in the testing period about 89 percent in payment was made during the testing period in those two buckets. And during the preference period it appears to be 92.6 or about 93 percent made during those two

1 | buckets as well.

Q Now was there any from a statistical point, was there any anomaly between those two numbers? In other words, was there any out of the ordinary between the historical period and the preference period?

A We did not see any. It seemed rather stable as far as a comparison is concerned. We then created yet a tighter interval or band and that would be in exhibit 6 to my report. In exhibit 6 to my report we have invoices in a range, it's entitled. And the range we created now instead of 1 to 45 days was 5 to 35 days. We got this range by looking at the graphical depictions that we created and also the graphical depictions from A.S.K.'s financial information after we adjusted it from invoice date to pay date to a days past due analysis. Because they use an invoice date to pay date.

When we do that, you'll see that roughly from 5 days to 35 days during the testing period you have roughly 75 percent of the payments in amounts captured in the interval. And in the preference period you have roughly 93 percent captured within -- that's an amount captured within that period. And if you look we also did it by percentage of invoices. 85 percent of the invoices during the testing period and 72 percent of the invoices within the preference period.

| 1 | All three are ways in which to use statistical |
|----|---|
| 2 | techniques to describe the various intervals. Statistical |
| 3 | significance, however, comes with, as it's generally |
| 4 | understood in the profession, comes with the standard |
| 5 | deviation and two standard deviations from the mean, the 22 |
| 6 | days before the due date to 66 days past the due date. That |
| 7 | would be statistical significance at a level of .05 or 95 |
| 8 | percent confidence interval. |
| 9 | Q During your analysis and review of the payments in the |
| LO | preference period, did you notice that one of the payments |
| L1 | was larger than the others? |
| L2 | A Yes, we did. |
| L3 | Q And which payment was that? |
| 14 | A That was a check amount in the preference period. |
| 15 | There were 13 checks in the preference period, a check |
| 16 | amount of \$865,371.67. |
| 17 | Q And did you investigate that further? |
| 18 | A Yes, we did. First we compared it to the largest check |
| 19 | amount during our historical period. All of this is found |
| 20 | on exhibit 5 as well at the bottom. And the largest amount |
| 21 | during the historical period, called the maximum, is |
| 22 | \$512,885.59. |
| 23 | THE COURT: Where are you on exhibit 5? |
| 24 | THE WITNESS: Exhibit 5, lower left payment |
| 25 | analysis at the bottom. |

- 1 THE COURT: Okay. Page 1.
- THE WITNESS: That's correct. I'm sorry, Your
- 3 Honor. Page 1.
- 4 BY MR. SCHACHTER:
- 5 A So we saw a check that was about \$350,000 larger than
- 6 | the largest check during the testing period.
- 7 | Q And did you further investigate that check, the
- 8 \$865,000 check?
- 9 A Yes, we did.
- 10 Q And what did you do?
- 11 A Well, we looked at a number of things. We looked at
- 12 | check date and exposure. We also looked at what invoices
- were paid by that check. A large check is suspect when
- 14 you're doing a preference analysis. So we wanted to see
- what were the invoices and the timing of the invoices, that
- were actually paid by that particular check. So what we did
- is went to our detail, exhibit 15, not the cover sheets, but
- 18 amended exhibit 15.
- 19 Q That appears, I believe, as exhibit 14 in the book,
- 20 defendant's exhibit 14?
- 21 A Yes. But not the first three pages.
- 22 O Okay. So excluding the first three pages.
- 23 A Right.
- Q The one that starts, amended exhibit 15. Then it says
- 25 preference period checks?

1 A That's correct.

- 2 Q And page 1 of 14?
- A That's correct. The first three pages, just to let you know, are not part of exhibit 15.

THE COURT: All right. Just for the record. We start with the tab that's marked D-14. The first three pages we're going to disregard for the moment. Page 4 under defendant exhibit 14 is entitled amended exhibit 15 and that refers to the exhibit number from the B.D.O. Seidman report.

THE WITNESS: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay.

BY MR. SCHACHTER:

A This is just a preference detail. This is during the preference period. And now what we're doing with this particular exhibit, we're matching invoices to the check that paid those invoices, and we identify terms and days outstanding here. So if you go, excuse me. If you go to the largest check, which is the check amount of \$865,000 and change during the preference period, which is page 11 of 14, you'll see that this invoice paid approximately -- or this check paid approximately 32 invoices.

Now we have the terms stated here. They were all invoices on 30 day terms and we have the days outstanding. And you subtract the days outstanding from the due date and you get the days past due. And what you get is a range of